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Entrepreneurship and the Role of Government 
in Post-Socialist Economies: 
Some Institutional Challenges 
David Smallbone & Friederike Welter ∗ 
Abstract: »Unternehmertum und die Rolle des Staates in postsozialistischen 
Wirtschaften: Einige institutionelle Herausforderungen«. The paper focuses on 
three interrelated themes: the regional dimensions of institutionalisation and 
entrepreneurship policies; dialogue and governance issues, which present 
enormous challenges in a situation where there is no recent tradition of self-
governing organisations; and regulation, in a context where the role of the state 
in relation to business needs to be redefined. The data used are drawn from a 
number of studies of entrepreneurship in countries that include Poland, the Bal-
tic States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova. 
The process of market reform requires a fundamental shift in the role of the 
state in the economy, as government replaces its roles as planner of resource 
allocation and price setter, owner and financier of enterprise activity through 
subsidies and transfers, with a role as regulator and facilitator of private enter-
prise activity, with all that involves. Not surprisingly, the experience in this re-
gard has varied considerably between countries, despite the fact that they may 
share a common socialist heritage. The contrasting experience described in the 
paper reflects differences in the level of commitment to market reforms, as 
well as in the knowledge and resources available to the state to implement 
what is required. For countries from Central and Eastern Europe that have re-
cently joined the EU, the process of Accession gave added impetus to the on-
going process of market reform. By contrast, in many of the CIS, the process 
of market reform has stalled, essentially because of a lack of recognition and 
commitment on the part of the state to creating the conditions to enable entre-
preneurs to fulfil their role as generators of wealth and drivers of economic de-
velopment. In such conditions, private businesses exist despite the policies and 
actions of government, although the extent of productive entrepreneurship is 
limited and the behaviour of entrepreneurs necessarily shaped by institutional 
deficiencies. 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, transition economies, government policies, insti-
tutions. 
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1. Introduction 
Although entrepreneurship and small business researchers have been concerned 
with the policy implications of their research for many years, there is evidence 
of increasing interest in policy issues, evidenced by the recent publication of a 
number of books on entrepreneurship policy (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2007; Hart 
et al., 2003; Lundström and Stevenson, 2005) and two special issues of interna-
tional journals1. At the same time, the emphasis in these publications is on 
entrepreneurship policy in mature market economies, where policy makers 
have considerable accumulated experience and the policy environment has 
evolved over many years. This contrasts with post-socialist economies in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where in many cases, 
private business activity was illegal prior to the 1990s. In view of the enormity 
of the challenge this represented to policy makers, post-socialist economies 
provide potentially rich ground for researchers interested in investigating the 
relationship between government policy and actions and entrepreneurial behav-
iour. This paper focuses on some of the key institutional challenges with re-
spect to entrepreneurship, facing policy makers in post-socialist economies.  
As entrepreneurship is increasingly recognised as a global phenomenon (re-
flected, for example, in the growing number of countries joining the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) project), it is important that entrepreneurship 
researchers acknowledge the heterogeneity of environmental conditions, out-
comes and behaviours associated with entrepreneurship (Davidsson, 2003). 
Whilst entrepreneurship results from the creativity, drive and skills of individu-
als (and groups of individuals), government is a key influence on the external 
conditions in which entrepreneurship occurs, influencing both the extent to 
which it develops and the form that it takes. In this context, it is argued that 
government policies and actions are a key element in the social embeddedness 
of entrepreneurship and, in some transition environments, a dominant influ-
ence.  
At the same time, it must be recognised that almost 20 years after the proc-
ess of market reform began, there is sufficient differentiation of experience 
between former centrally planned economies, to question the legitimacy of 
treating them as a single group (Smallbone and Welter, 2001). Whilst sharing a 
common heritage in central planning, considerable differences can be identified 
between, on the one hand, Central and East European countries (CEECs) that 
are now members of the EU, and which are best described as ‘emerging market 
economies’; and, on the other hand, former Soviet republics where the process 
of market reform is partial and in some cases has stalled completely. Although 
                                                             
1  In the International Small Business Journal (2009), a special issue on entrepreneurship 
policy and in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice (2008) a special issue on government 
policy and entrepreneurial activity. 
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the latter may be reasonably described as ‘transition economies’, use of the 
term can be questioned, if taken to mean the process of reform is ongoing, 
since in some countries, this is not the case.  
The challenge facing post-socialist economies at the start of the reform 
process was to create a policy context in which new businesses could be cre-
ated and grow, as part of a shift of the means of production from public to 
private ownership. As a result, any assessment of the role of policy in this 
regard needs to adopt a broadly based view of what constitutes public policy. 
This is because a wide range of government policies and actions can impact on 
entrepreneurship and small firms; not just those that are targeted in this way, 
since some of the influence of government on entrepreneurship and small busi-
nesses may be inadvertent. As a consequence, it is more appropriate to think in 
terms of the influence of government policies and actions on entrepreneurship 
and SMEs, rather than focus more narrowly on ‘entrepreneurship’ or ‘SME’ 
policy.  
In such a perspective, direct intervention designed to increase small firm’s 
access to finance, for example, may appear insignificant alongside the role of 
government in shaping the regulatory environment for private business; and/or 
influencing the value placed on enterprise and entrepreneurship in the society 
at large, through the actions of government representatives and officials. This is 
because, on the one hand, the experience of the transition period has been that 
an implementation gap has often existed between policy pronouncements and 
actions and, on the other hand that the regulatory environment has often been 
rapidly changing and unpredictable, constraining rather than enabling the de-
velopment of productive entrepreneurship. However, an emphasis on a broadly 
defined role for government incorporates the important role of institutional 
development, which involves not just market institutions, such as banks and 
other financial intermediaries, consultants and training organisations, but also 
public sector regulatory bodies of different sorts, together with market oriented 
behaviour on the part of such institutions. 
The evidence from the transition period suggests that establishing an appro-
priate and effective institutionalisation of entrepreneurship policy is one of the 
main preconditions for productive entrepreneurship to be developed and sus-
tained. Key roles for the state in this regard are to remove unnecessary obsta-
cles to enterprise creation; to establish a facilitating environment for private 
sector development; and contribute to the development of appropriate institu-
tions that operate to facilitate private sector development, not to prevent or to 
milk it, with punitive taxation and continual changes to the ground rules within 
which business must operate. The effective institutionalisation of SME policy 
involves different forms of partnership between government at different levels 
and various private sector bodies. A key priority in this respect is to establish 
the mechanisms for effective dialogue between the state and entrepreneurs. 
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Thus a key aspect of effective institutionalisation of policy is effective co-
ordination between the various institutions involved, both formal and informal. 
In this context, the rest of the paper focuses on three interrelated themes, re-
lated to the institutionalisation of entrepreneurship policy:  
- the regional dimensions of institutionalisation and entrepreneurship policies; 
- dialogue and governance issues, which present enormous challenges in a 
situation where there is no recent tradition of self-governing organisations;  
- and regulation, in a context where the role of the state in relation to business 
needs to be redefined.  
In discussing each theme, examples are presented from countries at different 
stages of market reform, in order to bring out the role of government as both an 
enabling and constraining influence. The data used in the paper are drawn from 
a number of studies of entrepreneurship in which the authors have been in-
volved since the mid 1990s, in countries that include Poland, the Baltic States, 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Moldova.  
2. The Regional Dimension 
Within post-socialist countries, the development of entrepreneurship varies 
considerably between regions and localities (Smallbone et al., 2001), as it does 
in most mature market economies (e.g. Reynolds et al., 1994). This draws 
attention to the role of regional and local governments in economic develop-
ment (Commission of the European Communities, 2001b) and the potential im-
portance of ‘bottom-up initiatives’, which may create the most effective milieu 
for entrepreneurship development. It means that there is a need for institutional 
capacity building at the local and regional levels, as well as at the national 
level, if the contribution of entrepreneurship to local/regional development is to 
increase.  
The socialist model of economic development was a centralised one in 
which local and regional government had little responsibility for, or powers to 
influence, economic development. In countries, such as Belarus and Russia, 
little has changed in this respect, thereby limiting the scope for regional devel-
opment programmes. This may be illustrated with reference to border regions 
(such as Belarus-Poland and Russia-Estonia); where cross border co-operation 
involving institutions and enterprises might help to stimulate economic devel-
opment. However, a lack of appropriate powers and resources at the regional 
level limits the scope for exploiting this potential. At the same time, previous 
studies have identified some local/regional variation in the attitudes of local 
government towards business in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, which is re-
flected in the behaviour of licensing officials and other employees, influenced 
by the guidelines laid down by the local mayor (Smallbone and Welter, 2009). 
As far as entrepreneurs are concerned, the local institutional environment was 
more ‘user-friendly’ in the capital than in the peripheral region. In other words, 
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a centralised government structure does not preclude some variation in the be-
haviour of government organisations at a local level. Moreover, it is at the local 
level where small firms typically come into direct contact with the various 
officials representing government, which in view of the room for discretion in 
interpreting laws and regulations on the part of those responsible for imple-
menting them, increases the scope for spatial variations (Smallbone and Welter, 
2001).  
In some countries (e.g. Estonia), the issue is associated with a need for a re-
form of local government structures, which have neither the capacity nor re-
sources to effectively engage in regional policy. However, there is also a need 
to examine the influence of ‘soft’ factors (i.e. informal institutions in North’s 
understanding, North, 1990), such as the level of involvement of local entre-
preneurs in the process, and the skills and capacities of local government in this 
area. 
The need for institutional capacity building at the regional level is a priority 
in CEECs that are now members of the EU. In Poland, administrative reforms 
in the late 1990s led to the creation of 16 new voivodships, replacing the 49 that 
had existed since 1975, which laid the basis of an institutional structure to 
facilitate a decentralised approach to development policy in Poland. The re-
forms resulted in the emergence of the Marshals Office in each vovoidship as 
key players in economic development, particularly in view of the important 
role for regions in accessing EU Structural Funds. However, as the role of the 
regions in economic development policy has grown, so this has increased em-
phasis on the adequacy of the legal framework, which appears to have some 
deficiencies, as far as local policy is concerned. It also emphasises the impor-
tance of co-ordinating national and regional policies, if duplication is to be 
avoided, complementarity maximised and potential synergy exploited. So 
whilst the new sub-national administrative structure seems to provide an ap-
propriate basis for a decentralised approach to entrepreneurship and economic 
development policy, the recent nature of the reforms is causing some teething 
problems with respect to the precise responsibilities of different levels of gov-
ernment, establishing effective working relationships and developing institu-
tional capacity. 
The institutional ‘hole’ at the regional level, which is typical of many post-
socialist economies, may be illustrated with reference to Romania, where one 
of the current policy priorities is to increase the competiveness of the SME 
sector, through innovation and a greater emphasis on non-price competitive 
advantages. However, addressing this issue satisfactorily, only partly depends 
on the attitudes and behaviours of entrepreneurs; it also has major implications 
for policy and institutional change. This is because innovation in SMEs often 
relies on external inputs from the regional and national innovation systems, 
which include public research institutions, technology transfer organisations, 
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education institutions, the legal, institutional and policy framework, as well 
enterprises.  
In a post-socialist context, it can be argued that the ‘soft’ elements of an in-
novation system gain particular importance because the ‘socialist heritage’ 
influences the current institutional frame for innovation as well as public atti-
tudes and the general understanding of what constitutes innovation. In the 
Soviet period, in-house research in firms played only a minor role in innovation 
(Paasi, 2000) and industrial research was mainly carried out in research institu-
tions of branch ministries. Even in countries that are at an advanced stage of 
transformation (such as Poland), the proportion of R&D expenditure spent at 
the firm level is much lower than in more established EU countries (Smallbone 
and Rogut, 2005). 
In this context, the creation of more market-oriented innovation systems in 
Romania presents a number of challenges. The fundamental problems are the 
weak link between R&D and production; the lack of any tradition of market 
driven research; and the low level of involvement of universities in developing 
co-operation with businesses. An additional issue is the effect of resource con-
straints, since some research institutions have been closed during the transition 
period due to a lack of finance, leaving researchers without paid employment. 
Another key institutional barrier at the regional level in Romania, as far as 
SMEs are concerned, is the absence of regional innovation systems, which 
means that support for innovation tends to be overly focused on the Bucharest 
region. The problem is compounded by the absence of a regional tier of gov-
ernment to facilitate the development of innovation systems at the regional 
level. It is true that the European Commission has encouraged the establish-
ment of Regional Development Agencies to enable Structural Funds to be 
distributed, but in practice these are little more than administrative offices 
because of a lack of embeddedness in the country’s governance structure. The 
nature and extent of development of regional innovation systems is particularly 
important in raising the innovative potential of SMEs (Asheim et al., 2003).  
Whilst research on innovative milieus emphasises the local and regional 
embeddedness of innovations in terms of trust, tacit local/regional knowledge, 
learning processes and informal interactions, spatial innovation systems also 
reflect the formal institutional settings and the inherent division of labour be-
tween enterprises and institutions. Clearly, then, one of the central reasons why 
a regional dimension to innovation systems and innovation policy is important 
is that some innovation activity in SMEs is territorially based , which means 
that innovation can be stimulated by co-operation between local players and 
place specific resources. At the same time, the role of local inputs into innova-
tion processes varies between types of SME, based on their sources of competi-
tive strength.  
These institutional challenges also raises questions concerning the respec-
tive responsibilities of authorities at different levels; the co-ordination of na-
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tional and regional support programmes; the establishment of appropriate lines 
of demarcation of responsibility; and the need to take steps to avoid unneces-
sary layers of bureaucracy and duplication of effort. There may also be a need 
to build institutional capacity at the regional and local levels, which may be 
dependent on a wider process of institutional reform.  
3. Governance Issues 
The term ‘governance’ is a very versatile one, referring to the exercise of 
power in both a corporate and a state context. The emphasis in this paper is on 
the latter interpretation, embracing actions by executive bodies, assemblies 
(such as national parliaments) and judicial bodies. The concept of governance 
extends beyond government to include, for example, the capacities of busi-
nesses, community groups and academic institutions (Hart, 2003). Since gov-
ernance is concerned with the rules, procedures and practices affecting how 
power is exercised, it embraces both formal and informal institutions, in the 
Douglass North sense, see North, 1990, 2005), as well as their legitimacy and 
effectiveness, which can have important implications for the development of 
entrepreneurship.  
In countries that are now member states of the EU the path to EU Accession 
has highlighted issues of governance, as part of an attempt to improve the ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy of institutions at an EU level. This is reflected in the 
EU’s White Paper on European Governance, which included participation as 
one of five key principles underpinning good governance. The others were 
openness; accountability; and effectiveness of institutions; and coherence be-
tween policies and actions, as well as between policies (European Commission, 
2001a). The participation principle draws attention to the nature and extent of 
the dialogue and co-operation between the state and representatives of entre-
preneurs, at different stages of the policy process, from conception to imple-
mentation. In mature market economies, self-governing, self-regulating organi-
sations act as professional intermediaries in the process of dialogue between 
government and entrepreneurs, in order to ensure that the interests of busi-
nesses are taken into account in the decision making of public authorities at 
different levels. Whilst Chambers of Commerce existed in the former Soviet 
republics during the socialist period, supposedly to represent the interests of 
business, they were effectively arms of the state, dominated as they were by 
large state-owned companies (OECD, 1996). As a consequence, Central and 
Eastern European countries have lacked a recent tradition and experience of 
self governing organisations, which has represented a particular challenge, as 
far as building institutional capacity during the Accession period is concerned.  
Institutional capacity includes the ability to lobby effectively, which is a 
function that did not exist during the socialist period. This weakness may be 
demonstrated with reference to consultations leading up to EU Accession, 
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which included employer’s organisations in the consultation process. However, 
having a place at the consultation table does not necessarily lead to active in-
volvement in and contribution to the process; and in Poland, for example, so-
cial partners were criticised for their lack of familiarity with procedural aspects 
of preparations for negotiations; as well as insufficient knowledge about inte-
gration processes and negotiations connected with them. Differences in the 
level of knowledge between government and non-governmental organisations 
seriously limit the possibility of conducting consultations based on partnership 
principles.  
Effective consultation and engagement with SMEs by policy makers is 
hampered by the current weakness and fragmentation of membership and rep-
resentative organisations for entrepreneurs. Membership of Chambers by busi-
nesses is not compulsory in Poland. The main national business organisations 
include the Polish Chamber of Commerce with 150 branch and regional mem-
ber Chambers; the Business Centre Club (BCC), with branches in 16 voivod-
ships; and the Polish Confederation of Private Employers (PKPP Lewiatan) 
(3000 members, 80% SME). The latter is present in 15 regions, although its 
activities at the sub-national level are restricted by a lack of resources. Al-
though the weakness of these structures makes effective consultation difficulty, 
it is important to recognise that entrepreneurs can be a difficult to reach group 
for consultation purposes, even in mature market economies.  
Unlike new member states of the EU, where there have been significant de-
velopments with respect to the openness of public institutions, participation by 
entrepreneurs in policy formulation, and the accountability of public institu-
tions, the situation in Belarus and members of the CIS in these respects, is far 
from encouraging. In this case, the state continues to play a dominant role in 
the economy, with the majority of enterprises and banks still under state con-
trol. From a governance perspective, many economic activities are regulated by 
Presidential decrees, which often contradict existing laws (EBRD, 2007). Re-
gulations often take the form of so-called ‘recommendations’ by government, 
such as lending rates for banks (both state-owned and private) and recom-
mended price levels. Such interference by the state is reminiscent of the Soviet 
period, when authoritarian control by the state over the economy was the norm. 
In addition, poorly specified legislation which leaves too much discretion in the 
hands of the (poorly paid) officials responsible for their implementation is 
fertile ground for corruption. From a governance perspective, the behaviour of 
public institutions is far from open, with the power of the state absolute. This is 
part of a wider absence of accountability, with poorly defined roles of public 
institutions involved in regulating and influencing private business activity; and 
a frequent lack of connection between policy pronouncements and actions by 
the state, particularly with respect to financial support measures. 
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4. Improving Regulation 
A key policy issue, which can be used as a litmus test for the effectiveness of 
the wider system of policy development and governance with respect to entre-
preneurship, concerns the effect of administrative and regulatory barriers on the 
establishment and subsequent development of enterprises. One of the key roles 
of government policy in a market-based system is to create an enabling envi-
ronment for entrepreneurship, thereby make an effective contribution to gener-
ating employment and economic development. At the same time, the state also 
has an important regulatory function to ensure that business operates within 
rules that seek to balance a need to encourage and promote enterprise with a 
need to protect wider social interests and the public good. Establishing an ap-
propriate balance between the creation of an enabling environment for business 
and ensuring that business operates within rules established to protect wider 
social interests and the public good, has been the subject of considerable debate 
in mature market economies, with some divergence of views (Bannock and 
Peacock, 1989; Harris, 2002; Storey, 1994). However, in a post-socialist con-
text, establishing an appropriate balance is doubly difficult because of the lack 
of any tradition of the state as a regulator of business activity.  
Regulation covers “the full range of legal instruments and decisions through 
which governments establish conditions on the behaviour of citizens or enter-
prises” (OECD, 1998). Compliance with regulations and other statutory re-
quirements involves a cost for business, which includes the opportunity costs 
with respect to the resources devoted to compliance, as well as any direct 
money costs. As a result, minimising the regulatory burden on business to the 
level that is necessary for the protection of the public good is a key element in 
government policy designed to encourage entrepreneurship and private sector 
development. Regulations that are overly burdensome, complex or impractical 
may reduce business competitiveness by contributing to higher administrative 
and compliance costs, as well as to a diminution of the rule of law when non-
compliance becomes rife.  
In this regard, the foundation of the rule of law is based on a mutual respect 
for the legitimacy of regulation by both government and citizens. Rather than 
viewing regulations as tools by which government directs its citizens, they may 
be seen as a means of limiting the power of the state by closely defining it. 
Such a view is based on the democratic principle of “co-operation” between 
government and its citizens, rather than an “authoritarian” style of regulation, 
which transition economies have experienced in the past. It should also be 
noted that regulations are part of a wider regulatory system that includes proc-
esses and institutions through which regulations are developed, enforced and 
adjudicated. Apart from the regulations themselves, the regulatory system 
includes processes of public consultation, communication and updating.  
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At the same time, it may be argued that individual businesses may benefit 
from regulatory intervention in some instances, as well as being burdened by it 
in others. An appropriate and effectively implemented framework of property 
rights and contract law can both enable and constrain business activity. As a 
result, in a report that is otherwise critical of the regulation of business by 
governments, the World Bank (2005) praises countries that have strengthened 
regulations regarding the protection of property rights, contract enforcement 
and the protection of investments. Although the issue of regulatory burdens can 
affect the development of all businesses, it can be a particular barrier during the 
start-up period, when entrepreneurs face many other demands on their time, in 
a context where time and money resources can be particularly scarce. All this 
affects transaction costs, which in turn can have implications for competitive-
ness, both domestically and internationally.  
With respect to regulatory reform, again there are considerable differences 
between post-socialist countries, particularly between the CIS and CEECs that 
are now members of the EU. One of the most difficult regulatory environments 
for private business is found in Belarus. This is reflected in the behaviour of the 
state registration agency, whose responsibilities for newly established busi-
nesses result in officials seeking to avoid future problems for themselves by 
demanding as many documents as possible from new entrepreneurs (Lyah and 
Pinigin, 2003). In addition, the State Control Committee, which is unique to 
Belarus, has sweeping powers to control prices, contracts, salaries and other 
aspects of business activity. Rather than providing encouragement and support 
for entrepreneurship, the government in Belarus appears to make life very 
difficult for entrepreneurs through administrative barriers and regulatory inter-
ference. This is reflected in procedures that involve the use of overly complex 
forms and requirements; an excessive number of forms and regulatory require-
ments; and frequent changes in forms and requirements. As a consequence, it is 
reported that a Belarusian company is obliged to obtain four to five times as 
many licences as companies in other CIS, with an average of 30 days to secure 
a single licence. On top of this they have to deal with certification, on average 
8.4 times a year, rising to 12.1 for businesses in transportation and communica-
tion and 10.9 in trade and public catering (Rakova, 2003). Another example 
concerns the procedures for levying and reporting taxes, where profits tax is 
said to be regulated by 150 legal documents, income tax by 100, and property 
tax by 50 and VAT by 180. 
Excessive regulations and procedures is one aspect, but so too is the contra-
diction between different pieces of legislation that often exists. A highly imper-
fect regulatory environment also breeds corruption because of the conflicting 
provision and instability of legislation; the overly broad brief of state agencies, 
which places a premium on ministerial rather than public interest; the plethora 
of controlling agencies with extensive competencies; an excessive number of 
poorly regulated procedures; a guiding principle for state agencies that every-
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thing is forbidden unless explicitly allowed; low awareness of legal issues on 
the part of both individual citizens and state officials; and an absence of a de-
tailed procedure for the imposition of economic sanctions, which leads to viola-
tion of the principle that “the punishment should fit the crime” (Zhuk, 2002). 
The latter gives state bureaucrats considerable scope to employ arbitrary action 
and abuse.  
In contrast, regulatory reform has become a priority issue for entrepreneur-
ship policy in post-socialist economies that are now part of the EU. During the 
last decade, the management of regulation has become a priority of EU institu-
tions, reflected in the drive for better regulation. The issue is especially impor-
tant in the case of the EU’s new member countries, where a particular chal-
lenge has been the need to simplify legislation, whilst, at the same time, 
adopting the “acquis communautaire”, as a condition of EU membership. The 
main focus of the simplification process is the reduction of the time and cost of 
registration and licensing, with “one-stop shops for administrative procedures a 
welcome development” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001: 
23). At the same time, there are still unresolved questions, such as the most 
effective consultation mechanisms to help governments to ‘think small first’.  
5. Conclusions 
Since the 1990s, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have embarked on a transformation of their entire political and 
economic systems, the scale of which is unprecedented in recent history. The 
collapse of the Berlin Wall signalled a process that has changed the course of 
history in Europe, whilst at the same time presenting enormous challenges for 
the countries involved. The shift from central planning to market based econo-
mies has involved much more than economic change to include the interrelated 
processes of economic, social and political change, which represents a major 
challenge for entire societies.  
Adapting the role of the state in the economy (and the wider society) has 
been a major part of the challenge, since the process of market reform requires 
a fundamental change in the role, type and behaviour of public institutions at 
the national and sub-national levels, as well as the establishment of new forms 
of governance. This reflects a need for a fundamental shift in the role of the 
state in the economy, as government replaces its roles as planner of resource 
allocation and price setter, owner and financier of enterprise activity through 
subsidies and transfers, with a role as regulator and facilitator of private enter-
prise activity, with all that involves. Not surprisingly, the experience in this 
regard has varied considerably between countries, despite the fact that they 
may share a common socialist heritage.  
The contrasting experience described in the paper reflects differences in the 
level of commitment to market reforms, as well as in the knowledge and re-
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sources available to the state to implement what is required. For countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe that have recently joined the EU, the process of 
Accession (which began several years before Accession itself in 2004) gave 
added impetus to the ongoing process of market reform. It included access to 
funds to assist with the ongoing restructuring, during the pre- and post-
Accession periods (Smallbone and Rogut, 2005). By contrast, in many of the 
CIS, the process of market reform has stalled, essentially because of a lack of 
recognition and commitment on the part of the state to creating the conditions 
to enable entrepreneurs to fulfil their role as generators of wealth and drivers of 
economic development. In such conditions, private businesses exist despite the 
policies and actions of government, although the extent of productive entrepre-
neurship is limited and the behaviour of entrepreneurs necessarily shaped by 
institutional deficiencies (Smallbone and Welter, 2006b). 
The experience of these former centrally planned economies during the last 
20 years must be included in any attempt to assess the wider role that the state 
plays in influencing the development of entrepreneurship. Although entrepre-
neurship results from the drive and commitment of individuals, government 
policies and actions can have a major influence on the nature and extent of the 
businesses that are created, as the extreme case of Belarus demonstrates. From 
a theoretical perspective, it is important that our concepts and analysis embrace 
entrepreneurship in a wide range of operating environments, rather than nar-
rowly focusing on the mature market context.  
Empirical assessment of the role of government in countries such as those 
featured in this paper underlines the importance of taking a broadly based view 
of what constitutes ‘policy’ with respect to entrepreneurship development. This 
is because ‘small business’ or ‘entrepreneurship’ policies, narrowly defined, 
either do not exist, or exist but are not implemented, or are implemented but 
affect so few businesses that they may be considered marginal to the entrepre-
neurship that develops. By contrast, policies related to taxation and the regula-
tory environment, and the behaviour of the institutions responsible for imple-
menting them, affect most businesses to some degree. Whilst the point is not 
confined to post-socialist countries, the existence of major institutional defi-
ciencies members of the CIS, draws attention to the role of the state in estab-
lishing and shaping the framework conditions determined by the state that are 
largely taken for granted in mature market environments. This in itself is an 
important reason why a full assessment of the role of the state in relation to 
entrepreneurship needs to embrace a wide range of political and economic 
contexts, including those featured here. 
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